Science

Add as a preferred source on Google

GAO Calls for Coordinated Management of U.S. Military Space Supply Risks

The review cited shortages that pushed a missile-warning program’s planned first launch to May 2027 and found three recommendations still open.

Updated 2 min read
A visitor approaches the U.S. Government Accountability Office headquarters in Washington, D.C. / EconoTimes.ai (mono)
A visitor approaches the U.S. Government Accountability Office headquarters in Washington, D.C. / EconoTimes.ai (mono)

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) says the Department of Defense (DOD) lacks a coordinated way to manage space-supply risks as it plans about $33 billion over five years for a transition to satellite networks.

In a Nov. 17 report, GAO examined the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), Global Positioning System III follow-on (GPS IIIF) and Resilient Missile Warning and Tracking Medium Earth Orbit (MWT MEO). The MWT MEO program’s planned first launch shifted from September 2026 to May 2027. Program officials cited shortages of printed circuit boards and long waits for microelectronic parts. Suppliers were also producing components for the same vendor across multiple platforms.

GPS IIIF and PWSA identified radiation-hardened processors as a risk; PWSA and MWT MEO flagged optical communications technology. GAO also found there is only one space-qualified supplier of cover glass used in satellite solar arrays.

PWSA demonstration satellites had an earlier delay, with their initial launch moving from September 2022 to April 2023. GAO partly attributed that shift to suppliers’ difficulty increasing output for the satellites’ optical communications terminals. The agency warned that supply-chain setbacks pose readiness risks and linked PWSA vehicle delivery and laser-communications delays to later on-orbit and warfighter acceptance testing.

An April 2026 Air Force memorandum announced a risk-management service for national security space systems within the Department of the Air Force. GAO found the memorandum did not clearly name a lead organization or define responsibilities. A related Space Systems Command guide cannot be enforced for stakeholders outside the Space Force, including the National Reconnaissance Office.

GAO called on the defense secretary to have the Air Force secretary and the National Reconnaissance Office director put their coordination in formal agreements. It also called for clear leadership and formal guidance for the risk-management service. DOD concurred with all three recommendations, which GAO lists as open.

The report describes a specialized, capital-intensive supplier base facing competition for components and manufacturing capacity. A March 2026 study by the Aerospace Industries Association and PwC found manufacturers were not adding capacity amid uncertainty about future government demand. Commercial operators are also expanding satellite constellations that use some of the same suppliers. DOD’s study of supply-chain capacity, lead times and bottlenecks for proliferated architectures is expected to be completed in March 2027, GAO said.

Related articles

View all