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NIST to Disallow Quantum-Vulnerable Cryptography After 2035

Its report also sets earlier federal milestones for post-quantum key establishment by 2030 and digital signatures by 2031.

Updated 2 min read
A technician connects a cryptographic test module at the NIST campus in Gaithersburg, Maryland. / EconoTimes.ai
A technician connects a cryptographic test module at the NIST campus in Gaithersburg, Maryland. / EconoTimes.ai

The National Institute of Standards and Technology says it will disallow quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography under its standards and guidelines after 2035, giving agencies and other organizations time to replace algorithms exposed to future attacks.

In its final report, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (NIST IR 8547), published Oct. 27, NIST sets out a two-stage timetable: deprecation after 2030, followed by disallowance after 2035. The five-year interval is intended to give lower-risk systems and older technology more time to migrate.

Specified high-value assets and high-impact federal systems face earlier milestones under Executive Order 14412. They must use post-quantum cryptography for key establishment by Dec. 31, 2030, and for digital signatures by Dec. 31, 2031. The broader federal goal of completing the migration by 2035 traces to National Security Memorandum 10.

The 2030 and 2031 milestones apply to specified federal systems. NIST says its broader roadmap is intended to help other organizations plan, with implementation details varying by organization.

NIST cites the risk that attackers could collect encrypted data now and try to decrypt it if quantum technology advances. No quantum computer capable of breaking the cryptography in question has been built. The agency released three post-quantum standards in August 2024, covering key establishment and digital signatures; EconoTimes previously covered the finalized standards.

NIST estimates that adopting the new algorithms across deployed technology could take 10 to 20 years. It says hybrid systems, which combine conventional and post-quantum algorithms, may help during the transition but can bring added complexity, security risks and costs.

NIST mathematician Dustin Moody, who heads the agency’s post-quantum cryptography standardization project, said, “We understand there’s not one strategy that fits all use cases.” A Government Accountability Office report published Oct. 6 found that none of 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies fully addressed the three preparatory practices it reviewed. The report cited gaps in cryptography expertise, systems inventories, migration funding processes and post-quantum testing plans.

Executive Order 14412 calls for public guidance on minimum cryptographic bill-of-materials elements within 270 days. NIST also plans more application-specific guidance, including a future update to its TLS guidance.

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