Mozambique’s deadly protests: how the country got here

The protests that followed Mozambique’s contested October elections have been the most protracted and deadliest since multiparty democracy in 1990. Police have reportedly killed at least 50 since Daniel Chapo, from the ruling Frelimo, was declared winner by a fanciful 70%. The party has been in power since independence in 1975.

A parallel count by the small party, Optimistic Party for the Development of Mozambique (Podemos), which supported opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane, claimed he was the rightful winner.

The government’s violent response to the popular protests has been condemned by various international entities. Less so by African regional ones, always very cautious when it comes to condemning a member country.

Mozambique finds itself in a situation it was in almost 40 years ago. Then it was forced to undergo a necessary but painful transition from its Marxist-Leninist path. This was precipitated by the collapse of its economy. It, however, remained an undemocratic one-party state. Today, it faces the challenge of changing its entire governance model.

I specialise in African politics, with a particular emphasis on Lusophone African countries, including Mozambique. In my view, the ongoing political crisis in Mozambique is rooted in history.

At independence from Portugal in 1975, the country became a one-party Marxist-Leninist state.

Immediately after independence, it was plunged in a bloody civil war between the new Frelimo government and Renamo.

In 1990, the country adopted a new constitution, marking

the beginning of a democratic climate that led the country to its first multiparty elections (in 1994).

A 1992 peace accord led to the downing of arms. However, rather than building on the new harmony between the political and social parties, Frelimo continued to control all state institutions. Its elites seized key economic assets. Yet another opportunity lost to embark on a democratic path.

Since departing from Marxist-Leninist path, officially in 1989, the party has been following a hybrid governance model. It has in place ineffectual, formally democratic institutions, amid an authoritarian political culture. Simply put, the country’s political system falls somewhere between a genuine democracy and an authoritarian regime.

If Mozambique’s Marxist revolution imploded some 40 years ago, undermining the dreams of social justice and progress it had promised at independence, today the funeral must be held for its hybrid model of democracy, that has played on too many ambiguities. The problems signified by the post-election crisis have been smouldering under the ashes for decades.

What bedevils Mozambique

Firstly, there has never been a climate of peace and genuine dialogue between Frelimo and Renamo, the protagonists in a long and bloody civil war (1977-1992).

Secondly, the “miraculous’ transition” from socialism to democracy had never seen popular public involvement with respect to strategic choices for the country. Importantly, a single-party (Frelimo) parliament approved the new democratic and pluralistic constitution (1990).

Thirdly, the legitimisation of the new democratic cause did not come so much from the voting citizenry, but from the international community. Specifically from western countries that, a few years earlier, had considered Frelimo the absolute devil. Renamo was the only bulwark against Marxist atheists linked to the Soviet Union, which denied its citizens individual, political and cultural rights.

Suddenly, Frelimo became the party to rely on to drive Mozambique’s development (and Western interests). Renamo was to play the role of a political extra, useful only to legitimise elections that are frequently won by Frelimo, without any serious capacity to win itself.

Finally, rampant corruption took root.

The first multi-party elections were held in 1994 and won by Frelimo. Despite some hiccups, they were widely considered free and fair.

The first challenge to this status quo came in the second multi-party elections of 1999, which the opposition candidate, Alfonso Dhlakama, is widely considered to have won. However, the Frelimo-controlled electoral commission declared the party’s Joaquim Chissano the winner. This, despite the reservations of independent observers.

Slide to authoritarianism

It was clear that no other political party in Mozambique would be able to govern the country, except Frelimo.

Thus, elections in the country went on to play a role of regularly returning Frelimo to power, with unreliable poll results, since the advent of multiparty democracy.

Everything has since played out on the edge of a very precarious balance: elections yes, but controlled, freedom of the press yes, but with few truly independent organs and most under the control, direct or otherwise, of the party-state.

Civil society, essentially financed by Northern European countries, is tolerated. The Frelimo political elite see it as hostile and in the pay of foreign interests. It was often the target of politically motivated attacks; from journalists, academics to activists. Lawyer Elvino Dias and opposition leader Paulo Guambe are the latest victims.

The 2014 elections, which were held in the midst of the second Frelimo-Renamo war, and elected Filipe Nyusi to power, were similarly stolen.

After the 2018 death of Dhlakama, Renamo’s long term leader, Renamo elected an uncharismatic general, Ossufo Momade, as its president. He was content to play second fiddle to Frelimo. He even negotiated his own party’s election results with Frelimo leader Filipe Nyusi, thus accepting a negotiated democracy.

However, some unforeseen variables entered the political game.

Firstly, the new Nyusi presidency showed, right from the start, signs of particular inefficiency. Major public services collapsed, driving citizens to exasperation. Frelimo’s electoral base began to show signs of impatience with a government that

• became increasingly corrupt

• failed to pay civil servants’ salaries regularly, triggering continuous strikes. Thus, morale in the army is low as it fights jihadist terrorism in Cabo Delgado under difficult circumstances.

The focus on individual and family interests, with a strong ethnic component by the president and his inner circle, has contributed to widening the gap between rich and poor. The poverty index has increased by 87% in the last 10 years.

Looking forward

According to Mozambican law, Nyusi is still the president until his successor begins his mandate on 15 January. In addition, the Supreme Court has not yet deliberated on the official election results.

Whatever happens in the coming months, what is certain is that Mozambique will never be the same.

If Chapo ultimately assumes the highest office in Mozambique, then authoritarianism will likely be consolidated. This is not so much because of his personal profile. But because he will have to govern against a large part of the population that is discontented.

He would thus likely resort to repression to contain dissent. Also because Nyusi will continue to wield considerable power behind the scenes as president of the Frelimo.

There is another possible way out of the crisis. That is to appoint a provisional, transitional government, cancelling the elections and preparing for a rerun in a few months, or a few years. This would entail Nyusi or a select committee playing the role of ferryman. This would be an elegant way to genuine democracy and for better times.