The return of the Russian threat

The ongoing headlines of an explosion of a Russian rocket—rumored to be a nuclear-powered missile—has caused far bigger shockwaves beyond the deaths of five scientists and elevated levels of radiation as far away as Norway. Coming just one week after the lapse of the US-Russian Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, it’s feared that the incident is a surefire sign that Russia is back as a serious threat to European security.

This increasingly hostile military behavior is being accompanied by aggressive commercial and diplomatic policies, with the planned Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline a particular concern for EU Commission, majority of members of the EU parliament and many individual EU states. Perhaps most concerningly of all, Germany’s unilateral support for the deal has proven to be a source of growing internal disunity in regions of strategic importance to the bloc and beyond.

A smorgasbord of grievances against NS2

NS2 is a planned pipeline that will link Russia and Germany by passing through the territories of Finland, Sweden and Denmark—despite all three nations having raised concerns about the project in the past. Although Finland eventually granted a permit for its construction, environmental law firm ClientEarth filed a complaint to block it on environmental grounds, a worry which Stockholm shares.

Sweden has also previously suggested that Nord Stream could be used for spying purposes by its Russian owners—as one security analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency put it, “The project will only cause trouble. Sweden has nothing to gain from it”. Despite these misgivings, both nations have given the go-ahead for the project, while their Scandinavian counterpart Denmark has not, prompting Russia to seek an alternative route that avoids Danish waters. But while the Nordic countries might have a say in whether the pipeline does reach completion, they are unlikely to suffer the consequences most keenly.

That privilege is reserved for Ukraine. Given that Kiev currently receives around $3 billion each year in transit fees for the gas passing through its borders – a figure representing approximately 3% of its GDP – the construction of an alternative conduit could cripple it financially. Though the economic implications of NS2 for Kiev are enormous, given Ukraine’s recent altercations with Russia, a reduced GDP could be the least of their worries.

With a direct gas line to Germany, Ukraine (and Belarus) would be rendered virtually redundant to Russian interests, giving them more leeway to show even greater aggression than that which has claimed the lives of over 10,000 people in the ongoing war. More cynically, Ukraine would become more expendable to European interests and could potentially see reduced support in terms of the EU’s and NATO’s military strategy.

EU and NATO also under threat

Such a shift in policy would be a grave mistake. NS2 would marginalize Ukraine and hand unprecedented control of Europe’s energy supplies to Moscow, as well as giving Russian naval forces a pretext for patrolling its entire length. For countries who have experienced the after-effects of Russian aggression firsthand and still view the superpower as an untrustworthy ally at best and an outright threat at worst, support of NS2 is only certain to drive them towards the protection afforded by the United States.

Alongside Poland, which shares similar apprehensions about the intentions of President Putin, the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have already sought to involve Washington in their Three Seas Initiative (TSI). Ostensibly aimed at improving economic and political collaboration among 12 littoral countries based on the shores of the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas, the TSI has the secondary effect of fragmenting the EU’s beehive mindset.

These permutations haven’t gone unnoticed. A Polish MP submitted a list of 10 threats that the pipeline could pose, while even France – whose utility company Engie has a direct vested interest in the project – has spoken out against it on the grounds that it infringes upon EU interests and marginalizes the smaller countries mentioned above, risking potentially divisive consequences within the EU. As a result, France championed a proposed amendment to EU law which would make NS2 less profitable to Russia and more accessible to its competitors.

France’s move was a valid one, given the simple fact that NS2 is considered a clear security threat both for Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe, because under pressure from Moscow, a country like Germany could decide to turn off gas supplies, affecting Eastern European countries. A precedent exists in Hungary’s 2014 decision to stop all gas deliveries to Ukraine, following a warning from Russia that Hungary itself would get cut off if it doesn’t stop re-exporting gas to Ukraine.

Despite these criticisms, Germany has remained steadfast in its support of the deal. Claiming NS2 is purely an economic decision, it has lobbied hard to achieve a watered-down compromise of the proposal which is barely worth the paper it is written on. Given that Germany has previously blocked attempts by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia to establish similar pipelines, their behavior regarding Nord Stream has been interpreted by many as hypocritical.

Mounting aggression couldn’t come at worse time

Sensing this increasing discord among the EU and its allies, and capitalizing upon the recent lapse of the INF, Russia has ramped up their military presence in sensitive regions. As well as modernizing its Baltic fleet, flying more aircraft over Baltic airspace than in recent years and even prompting NATO interference in the area, Russia have now been testing out mysterious missiles with reportedly devastating capabilities.

Signed in 1987, the INF led to the destruction of more than 2,700 nuclear weapons with a range of up to 5,500km and has played an instrumental part in keeping the world at peace over the last three decades. Unfortunately, its expiration couldn’t have arrived at a more inopportune moment. With Trump’s finger hovering over the trigger and the EU unable to come to a consensus, the Russian threat looks more primed and powerful than at any time in recent memory.

This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or management of EconoTimes.